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
THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:
'BENIGN NEGLECT' REVISITED(U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE
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
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:
"BENIGN NEGLECT" REVISITED

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID L. BENTON, III, FA

7 MAY 1984

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:
"BENIGN NEGLECT" REVISITED

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
7 May 1984

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PREFACE

This Individual Study Project was conducted in fulfillment of the course of study at the U.S. Army War College. The scope and general methodology of the study were developed by the author. The study is designed to report the results of a coordinated concentration of study efforts during the 1983-84 academic year conducted by the author. This effort included professional readings, selection of Sub-Saharan Africa as a regional appraisal subject, Advance Course selection with a focus on Sub-Saharan African issues, and discussions with various individuals in the Government involved with policy-making in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.

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
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MAP 1

Republic of South Africa and
Routes of the "Great Trek" (1835)*




Trek Leaders

— L. Trichardt
--- A.H. Potgieter
... P. Retief

- * The Great Trek began in 1835 but it is not easy to determine when it ended, although the organized move from the Cape Province went on steadily for about five years. There was a second trek that began in 1843 with the withdrawal from Natal to what is now the Orange Free State

Africa



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"The problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the color-line, the relation of the darker to the lighter race of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea."

1

W.E.B. Du Bois

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION - WHY SOUTH AFRICA?

At a time when domestic issues cry out for attention and resources, when the United States remains preoccupied with the urgency of problems in NATO and a growing Soviet threat, with a delicate and volatile situation in the Middle East, and with a host of other economic and political problems, there has been a tendency to relegate African problems to a low priority on the agenda of national and international concerns. Indeed, there is a tendency to feel that African issues can wait while we deal with more critical and immediate problems.

Yet the African continent currently is the scene of two great dramas whose outcome has major implications for US foreign policy, for the American people, and for our western allies. In the Horn of Africa a major conflict is on-going between Somalia and Ethiopia, the outcome of which has implications on American interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. And in southern Africa the basic human rights struggle by the black majority in the Republic of South Africa continues to smoulder, with the question of neighboring Namibia's independence threatening to become the spark to transform the smoulder into a conflagration.

However, the conflict in the Horn of Africa is of a different nature

than the one in southern Africa. Whereas the former involves the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of national boundaries, the latter centers on a basic question of racial superiority. It is this situation in southern Africa which I will address in this study, for it represents what I believe to be in the long run a major policy dilemma for the United States.

It is fair to ask why one should be interested in what appears to be a fundamentally asymmetric relationship between the United States and the Republic of South Africa. The United States is, on the whole, far more important to South Africa than is South Africa to the United States, arguments about the Cape sea routes and strategic minerals notwithstanding.

"When Washington sneezes, Pretoria catches a cold, or at least worries about getting one. When Pretoria sneezes, Washington may or may not proffer a handkerchief, depending upon its mood and its preoccupation with other matters." ² Yet, both the history and demography of the United States make South Africa a matter of special concern for Americans.

Our nations have been allies in situations of international conflict including cooperation in the two World Wars, the Berlin airlift, and the Korean War. ³ We share significant economic interests. We both remain ideologically opposed to Communism and its spread throughout the world, particularly into the developing nations of Africa. Despite this the United States leads the western world in denouncing the South African nation and has taken the lead in attempting to create change in the policy of apartheid.

Paradoxically in doing so, various American administrations have themselves come under criticism over their policies towards South Africa.

In fact there are few nations in the world which seem to evoke such strong and emotional responses from a wide range of American institutions as the Republic of South Africa. Many churchmen and religious groups in the United States, joined by associated international associations, have spoken out against US policy towards the Republic of South Africa asking that the United States participate in embargoes and economic sanctions against the Republic. Although there is disagreement among church leaders over the pace of change and whether the main forces of change should come from within or outside South Africa, there is a consensus over the ultimate need⁴ for change and an active role for the United States.

American colleges and universities have taken action to express disapproval of US relations with the Republic of South Africa. With a broad array of domestic and international issues to choose from, it has been a focus on American and South African political and economic involvement that frequently has prompted student action. In 1977 Stanford University had 294 students arrested during demonstrations against South Africa. Over 3000 Harvard University students demonstrated in 1978. The Yale Corporation demanded a firmer US policy towards South Africa in 1978. In 1979 strong demands were made from within the Harvard community to divest itself of all holdings in corporations with investments in South Africa and to cease any business involvements, purchases, or endowments with the⁵ same.

Particularly vocal have been various black American constituency groups which have had a considerable impact on focusing Congressional attention on American involvement with the Republic of South Africa. As early as the 1950s these groups, though relatively less vocal than later

ones, included the African-American Institute (1952), the American Committee on Africa (1953), the American Society of African Culture (1957), and the African Studies Association (1957).⁶

In the late 1960s more well-known and active black organizations began focusing attention on American involvement with South Africa. The American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (with Martin Luther King as its president), the National Urban League, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People formed a sizeable and vocal constituency. It is little wonder that the Congress became more active in questioning American foreign policy and business cooperation with the Republic of South Africa and that southern Africa became an issue in the 1976 presidential campaign.⁷

The accusations being made by each of these American institutions is that the United States, through an improper foreign policy, is encouraging and supporting the cruel oppression and exploitation of black Africans by a racist white minority government. Each of these institutions has demanded that the United States change its foreign policy towards the Republic of South Africa and that laws affecting business involvement by American corporations be instituted.

Such an outcry from the various corners of America for so long make the study of American-South African relations worthwhile. Americans simply should be better informed about such volatile foreign policy issues. It is my intent in this study to report my research into the development of the US policy towards the Republic of South Africa. My research effort has involved studying the nation of South Africa, its history, people, economics, and policies; a review of US interests in the southern Africa

region; an examination of current policy statements concerning South Africa; and lastly, an evaluation of this policy. Following this Introduction (Chapter I), Chapter II will include a brief history of the Republic of South Africa. My intent is to place into perspective why South Africa is the way it is today. Chapter III will outline the US socio-economic, political, and security relationships and interests in South Africa. A review of American policy towards South Africa, its evolution during the past two decades, and its present form will compose Chapter IV. The concluding Chapter V is an analysis of current policy.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. W.E.B. Du Bois, "Of the Dawn of Freedom," in The Souls of Black Folk, p. 35.

2. Sanford J. Unger, "South Africa in the American Media," in The American People and South Africa. ed. by John Barratt and Alfred O. Hero, Jr., p. 25.

3. Daan Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy and the Republic of South Africa, p. 1.

4. Paul Deats, "U.S. Religious Institutions and South Africa," in The American People and South Africa. ed. by John Barratt and Alfred O. Hero, Jr., p. 103.

5. James G. Lubetkin and Lawrence F. Stevins, "American Universities and South Africa," in The American People and the Republic of South Africa, ed. by John Barratt and Alfred O. Hero, Jr., pp. 129-130.

6. Philip V. White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980," in The American People and the Republic of South Africa, ed. by John Barratta and Alfred O. Hero, Jr., p. 85.

7. Ibid., p. 93.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

EARLY CAPE PROVINCE SETTLEMENT

Human life has existed in southern Africa for thousands of years, but of the present inhabitants, the earliest are the peoples whom the European settlers called Bushmen and Hottentots - members of the Khoisan language group of which only a few survive. Members of the Bantu language group, to which most of the present-day Africans of South Africa belong, migrated slowly southward from central Africa and began to enter the Transvaal (refer to Map 1) sometime before A.D. 100. The Nguni ancestors of the Zulus and Xhosas had occupied most of the east coast by 1500. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the Cape of Good Hope in 1486. Because the journey from Europe to India and Malaysia was so tedious by sailing ship (approximately 18 months in that era), it was necessary for European sailors to call at Rio de Janeiro on the east coast of South America for fresh food and water, and then to stop at Table Bay, in Cape Province, for fresh supplies before continuing on to the East. Consequently, in 1652 the Dutch East India Company ordered the establishment of a permanent settlement at Table Bay, the site of today's Cape Town, under the direction of Jan van Riebeeck. His orders were to ensure a supply of fresh vegetables, meat, and water for ships passing eastwards and westwards. In 1657, however, it was decided to permit Dutch soldiers, on their release from military service, to colonize the lands immediately adjacent to the Cape and to establish their own farms as "free burghers". The white settlement of South Africa had begun.

At this time there was only a sparse population of Hottentot and Bushmen peoples.

The Dutch were eventually joined by Huguenot refugees from France in 1688 and some other small groups of Europeans, including a sprinkling of Englishmen. While this small infusion of Europeans was not threatening to the Dutch, there was concern about a major advance by other European powers since many of their ships were now passing through the Table Bay harbor on their way to and from the Far East. Thus, construction of a fortress to guard Table Bay was begun and completed in 1700. Steadily the number of free burghers establishing their small farms along the coastlands increased and by 1707 the colony had become the producer of an abundance of surplus food.

Under the leadership of Simon van der Stel, the first governor of South Africa, the Dutch colony grew and prospered. He infused a local patriotism into the colonists and was founder of the first village in the interior, named Stellenbosch after him. ² Settlement of the free white burghers pressed even over the coastal mountains into the interior, into lands which were essentially vacant or only thinly populated. By 1725 farming settlements had spread inland as far as the Orange River. As the number of permanent white settlers increased, a new nation began to take shape, exactly as it had among our English ancestor colonists in North America, and the farmers began to think of themselves as "Afrikaners" rather than as Dutchmen or Germans. These Afrikaners began to resent the orders and taxes imposed upon them from Holland, in much the same way that the English colonists in North America were to resent the orders received from Europe without the right of representation. Several minor disturb-

ances resulted and, although these were easily suppressed, the Dutch East India Company began to rethink its policy of permitting and encouraging the expansion of free colonial settlers.

BRITAIN TAKES OVER

Thus the Afrikaner free burghers developed their own way of life and a form of self-government, rooted in strong Calvinist religious convictions and a resentment of taxation by a distant government. But the invasion of Holland by the revolutionary French armies led to the destruction of the old Dutch order of government and provided an opportunity for the British to seize control in Cape Town in 1795. To the British the Cape was also important as a vital link with their growing Indian trade. This marked the³ beginning of a long conflict between the Afrikaner and the English. Under British rule efforts were made to "anglicize" the Cape Colony which heretofore had been almost entirely non-British. This took the form of introducing some 5000 English immigrants in 1820 followed by the banning of the⁴ Dutch language in 1822. The overall effect of these actions by the British rulers was to alienate the majority Dutch population. Relations between the Afrikaners and the British government were further damaged when the British Parliament in distant London passed the bill emancipating slaves throughout the British-ruled parts of the world, and the free burghers were ordered to free their slaves. This was in 1833, and in 1835 the Great Trek of Afrikaner farmers began, the object of which was to leave the Cape Province and escape from British rule towards self-government in the hinterland not yet claimed by Britain.

THE GREAT TREK

More than 10,000 people, mostly of Dutch origin, left Cape Colony and moved north across the Orange River in covered wagons in much the same way as did the western American settlers (Map 1). The Great Trek brought these Afrikaner colonists into conflict, for the first time on any major scale, with southward invading native hordes known as Bantus. For several years the "Boers", which these Dutch Afrikaners were now called, fought the organized armies of the Zulu tribe, the dominant native tribe in the area, until in a final battle at Blood River 700 Boer farmers defeated some 12,500 Zulu warriors in a dramatic battle. The Zulus lost 3000 men and the Boers 200. While the losses were heavy for both sides the Boers emerged as victors and the way was open for them to establish themselves independently from the British. This was the major significance of the Great Trek - the interior was opened to European settlement. The Great Trek should also be considered as part of the general expansion which had been going on in the Cape Colony from the earliest days. The major difference was that the trekker Boers were not interested in expanding the colony, but rather with leaving it behind.⁵

In 1852 the land occupied by the Boers north of the Vaal River was declared independent and later that year became the South African Republic (Transvaal). Two years later, in 1854, the land between the Orange and Vaal⁶ Rivers was also declared independent becoming the Orange Free State. Boer independence was not to last beyond 1871 in Orange Free State and 1877 in the South African Republic when diamonds and gold were discovered and the

British annexed the two states. The British invested heavily in the mining activities and also became involved in governing the two states. Resentment of British encroachment lead to the South African War of 1899-1902, commonly referred to as the Boer War. This war was to last thirty-two months and cost thousands of lives on both sides. The Orange Free State and the South African Republic were united from the outset. All told, the two countries mustered 52,000 semi-trained "commandos", mostly farmers armed with a hodge-podge of weaponry and uniforms. At the start the British had as many men but no real art of the mounted "mobile warfare" employed effectively by the Boers. The Boers, under brilliant leadership of Generals Christiaan de Wet, Koos de la Rey, Louis Botha, Christiaan Beyers, and Jan Smuts, fought an offensive war the first year, then slowly changed to using guerilla tactics.⁷ However, the British did ultimately prevail, using over 450,000 men to crush the Boer Republics. The cost of the war on the Boer side was high and almost every farmstead in the two Republics was left a burned-out ruin. About 5,000 Boer soldiers were lost in the war and almost 28,000 women and children ultimately died of diseases after being herded into refugee camps during and after the war. The British suffered 98,000 casualties (7,000⁸ dead from action or wounds). Although the British won the war, it was very unpopular and caused great resentment against the British government both domestically and overseas.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA IS FORMED

During the years of reconstruction (1902-1910) the British did their best to unite the bitterly war-torn country. They extended responsible

self-government under the British flag until Parliament passed the South Africa Act in 1909 which established the Union of South Africa in 1910 as a new dominion, a self-governing nation of the British Empire. The Union was composed of the four states of Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, and South Africa Republic.

Several of the outstanding leaders who had emerged during the Boer War were to have a great influence on the future development of this new nation. Four of these able young leaders, Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, James Hertzog, and Daniel Malan dominated South African politics for the next fifty years. General Botha became the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa and, although there were still significant differences between the pro-British and anti-British groups, he led the Union of the four former colonies towards a steadily increasing prosperity.

The Botha government consolidated the civil service, as it had the rail system, and provided for a national defense force via the Union Defence Act of 1912 with General Smuts as Minister of Defense. The government was keenly aware of the problem of dealing with the mostly uneducated Bantus who were four times more numerous than the whites. The first action taken was to establish a central agency, the Department of Native Affairs. Three years later the Native Land Act, or Bantu Land Act, was drafted and enacted into law. It put aside 8.9 million hectares of land for the Bantus, land which could not be sold to the whites. The significance of the Act, which was drafted by Minister of Native Affairs Hertzog, lies in the introduction for the first time of the principle of territorial
9
division between blacks and whites.

After the death of Botha in 1919, General Smuts, who had been serving

in London on the Imperial War Cabinet and was a major contributor to the formation of the League of Nations, became Prime Minister. Under his leadership South Africa weathered several economic crises as a result of World War I. He kept affairs fairly stable however and even attempted to¹⁰ merge with Rhodesia (which was rejected by a popular vote in 1922).

General Hertzog formed the National Party in 1913 and was in favor of a dual English-Afrikaners society. The Party, whose motto was "South Africa First", steadily gained strength in the Parliament and was successful in getting Hertzog elected as Prime Minister in 1924, the third Boer General in a row to hold that position. In relation to England Hertzog constantly sought a completely independent South Africa, and as a result of his efforts the British Parliament recognized South Africa's absolute and sovereign independence in free association with other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1931. Prime Minister Hertzog, in 1926, started a fierce controversy, one that continues in more or less the same form today, by his announced policy of segregation of the native Africans. This policy has become known by the Afrikaaner word apartheid, which translated means "apartness" or "separate living". Apartheid has evolved into an all-embracing political and social theory and, as will be discussed later in this chapter, it has taken on the full significance of an ideology for the Afrikaner Nationalist of South Africa.

In spite of the efforts of Prime Minister Hertzog to keep South Africa out of World War II, General Smuts led a successful campaign opposing that position. The House of Assembly voted in favor of entering the war on the side of the Allies. General Smuts became the leader of the coalition

government that was formed to conduct South Africa's participation in the war, and General Hertzog went into the opposition. South Africa's military forces made a significant contribution during the war, and its industrial capability provided important wartime goods for the Allies. After the war General Smuts was chief of the South African delegation to the international conference at San Francisco in 1945 and was a principal author of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

THE REPUBLIC AND APARTHEID

It was during the fifteen years following World War II that South Africa assumed its present form of government. There were two main developments during these years: the Afrikaners, finally establishing themselves in power, made it their policy to settle the racial question through the separate development of the white and non-white groups; and the adoption of a constitution which refuted dominion status under Great Britain in favor of an independent republic. This latter occurrence resulted from a referendum in 1960, and in October 1961 South Africa withdrew its application for continued membership in the British Commonwealth.

The word apartheid, destined to assume such a tremendous significance, has been traced by linguists to 1943 when it was used in a newspaper article.¹¹ The word simply means "separateness" or "apartness". While the word was original for the new Republic, the idea which it was intended to express was not. The separation of whites and "non-whites" was a goal which had been pursued at many stages of the country's history.

It was in 1913, however, that the cornerstone of apartheid was laid with the Native Land Act, the first legislation to designate "reserves"

where the blacks would live and become their own masters. The Act said that no African could buy or lease land from a European. This effectively reduced an African's opportunity to own land to one-eighth of the country.¹² This Act has subsequently been amended and supplemented by other legislation which collectively provides for the separate development of white and non-white South Africans. Such legislation is sometimes called "grand-apartheid" as distinguished from the volumes of repressive legislation that have appeared since 1948 and are called "petty-apartheid". (A summary of apartheid-related legislation is included in Appendix A.)

PRESENT DAY SOUTH AFRICA

As even the critics of apartheid must admit, the recent governments of the Republic of South Africa have not been weak, inefficient, or corrupt. On the contrary, they have proven to be tough, talented, dedicated, and determined to survive. The Republic has built a powerful economy of which it is justly proud. It is by far the most industrialized nation on the entire African continent. Its peoples, including the non-whites, enjoy a higher standard of living than any other African nation. Its population demographics (rate of growth, mortality rates, etc.) are the most favorable on the African continent, both for whites and non-whites.

This then is the international paradox known as South Africa. A nation with many favorable attributes with which another nation would want to be a friend and ally; but with an internal policy that, for the foreseeable future, precludes their full acceptance as a respected member in the community of nations.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Department of State, Background Notes - South Africa, p. 2.
2. South Africa 1976, p. 45.
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4. South Africa 1976, p. 46.
5. N.E. Davis, A History of Southern Africa, p. 51.
6. Roger Pearson, "Historical Background," in South Africa - The Vital Link. ed. by Robert L. Schuettinger, p. 22.
7. South Africa 1976, p. 50.
8. Ibid.
9. Pearson, p. 24.
10. South Africa 1976, p. 52.
11. Pearson, p. 24.
12. Robert Lacour-Gayet, A History of South Africa, p. 295.
13. Davis, p. 124.

CHAPTER III

US INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

"Seldom before in history has an alliance overlooked or neglected an area of immense economic importance to its goals and security. From this standpoint the neglect of the Republic of South Africa by the West is perhaps unprecedented in history".¹ This statement, made by an economist and researcher for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, provides a good introduction into a discussion of US (and, indeed, western alliance) interests in the Republic of South Africa, for they are extensive. The variety of these interests, as well as their relative degrees of importance, is a phenomenon that complicates the selection of policy toward South Africa. Some of the interests discussed are not shared by all citizens and, in this sense, they reflect America's pluralistic society. The purpose of the discussion in this chapter will be to identify as many of these interests as possible in view of the fact that they are critical to the formulation of policy. Interests may be thought of as being primarily social, economic, geo-political, and political in nature, although each may have impacts in all four areas.

SOCIAL INTERESTS

The United States has at least two historic ties with South Africa which may be translated into interests of a social nature. One of these is with the white minority population, especially the faction that has descended from the British influence. Like the United States, South Africa has been strongly influenced by Great Britain. And, whereas British-South

African relations have always been tumultuous, if not sometimes hostile, it is obvious that there are strong cultural and social ties, military agreements, and extensive economic relations between those countries that have persisted.² American social and cultural ties with Great Britain form a common interest that we share with South Africa.

Whereas the first socio-cultural tie mentioned was exclusively with the white population of South Africa, the second one focuses on the majority black population. Modern black Americans look to Africa as the homeland from which they derive new dignity and equality. Indications of this popular movement are evidenced by the interest in "black studies" at American universities and colleges during the past decade and the associated African-based styles of clothing and fashion which were seen frequently among American blacks. The identification of black Americans with the racial and political aspirations of black South Africans is increasingly widespread, and is a relatively recent development.³ During the Twentieth Century until the end of World War II, racial internationalism in the black American community was articulated consistently by a narrow elite such as Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Paul Robeson, while mass interest was stirred primarily through black churches. Widespread pro-Africa sentiments were aroused by the activities of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s and by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.⁴ Condemnations of colonial rule and imperialism were particularly common within the pan-African movement in the United States.

In the years following World War II an unusual, but explainable, phenomenon occurred in which there was a marked decline in black leaders' initiatives on African affairs. It is believed that the combined effects

of the cold war, the actions of liberal whites, and the progress of the movement towards civil rights in the United States caused black leaders to become more restrained in their approach to South Africa. James Roark, in a perceptive article concerning black American leaders' response to the cold war and African colonialism, observed that black leaders felt obligated to affirm their loyalty to the United States and to demonstrate that their civil rights campaign was not communist-inspired at a time when many conservative Americans were ready to believe that communist instigation lay behind black demands for civil equality.⁵

Black American interest in and awareness of African affairs generally remained relatively passive until a series of dramatic developments in the late 1950s occurred. Interest was rekindled in 1957 by the independence of Ghana and the attempts by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah to promote Pan-African unity and his appeals to American blacks to participate in the rebirth of Africa. Other states, including Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, and Zaire (The Congo), won independence in rapid succession. The disintegration of Zaire into civil war and the murder of Patrice Lumumba riveted the attention of many American blacks. In March 1960, following rural uprisings in Pondoland, peaceful protestors were shot and killed in what became known as the Sharpeville massacre, and awareness of the plight of black South Africans burned itself into the consciousness of black Americans in an unprecedented fashion. Interest has never waned since.

Most black Americans whose ancestors were slaves cannot accurately trace their African origins to specific modern African countries. Although there are some records of ports from which slave ships sailed, there is a

lack of historical evidence as to the tribal origins of the slaves. This is supported by the fact that modern nations have evolved from colonial territories which seldom coincided with tribal boundaries. As a consequence, associations made by black Americans is usually made with the entire black population south of the Sahara Desert. Black American interests in the Republic of South Africa exist today primarily because the policy of apartheid is seen as the epitome of exploitation and mistreatment of the Negro race. Pretoria is seen as the capital of all white minority rule over all of black Africa. This strong socio-cultural interest is one which has, in the recent past, and will undoubtedly continue to influence the US approach toward the Republic of South Africa.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The US economic links with South Africa provide a uniquely painful moral and political dilemma. Embarrassed and pressured at home and abroad for being involved in business relations in the Republic of South Africa, yet mindful of the economic benefits (jobs, income, foreign exchange earnings, and raw materials are derived from these trade and investment links), American-South African commerce has gone on, although doubtfully as large as some writers have charged.

The most widely published U.S. economic link with South Africa is the level of U.S. direct investment, defined as all investment in which U.S. investors have an effective voice in the management of the overseas operation. In practice, the U.S. Department of Commerce considers an investment to be direct if the U.S. investor holds 10% or more of the outstanding shares of the overseas affiliate and has the right to nominate one or more

directors.⁶ Despite claims by some that investments in the Republic of South Africa are highly profitable to overseas investors, U.S. direct investments there as a percentage of total overseas investments by U.S. firms have remained fairly stable at 1.1 to 1.9 percent since 1950. The total book value of U.S. direct investments was roughly \$2 billion in 1980.⁷ While one could argue that this amount is of relatively small significance, it should be noted that this is an almost threefold increase (up from \$0.7 billion in 1970) during the past decade reflecting a continuing interest by American businesses.

U.S. exports to South Africa in 1982 had reached \$2.4 billion, up 60% from the 1979 level (Table 1). It is commonly believed that this level of exports supports 50,000 jobs, or approximately 0.05% of the 99 million jobs in the U.S. economy.⁸ Although this is a miniscule percentage of total U.S. employment, 50,000 additional unemployed workers would worsen an already bad situation and, therefore, could be considered a matter of concern to policy makers.

Probably the most important economic interest to the United States is South Africa's role in providing some degree of economic stability to the poor black nations in southern Africa. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has stated that "our national interests are best served by an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth, which alone can nurture modern African economic and political institutions".⁹ This is part of the fundamental principle behind the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" in the search for a more stable, secure, prosperous, and democratic southern Africa. If South Africa does not

TABLE 1

SOUTH AFRICA IMPORT/EXPORT DATA
(\$ BILLIONS)

	<u>Imports from US</u>	<u>Exports to US</u>	<u>Total Imports(US%)</u>	<u>Total Exports(US%)</u>
1979	1.5	1.7	9.0 (16.7)	18.4 (9.2)
1980	2.5	2.1	19.2 (13.0)	25.7 (8.2)
1981	2.5	1.5	22.6 (11.1)	20.9 (7.2)
1982	2.4	2.0	18.5 (13.0)	17.7 (11.3)

Data compiled from: Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1983. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; and Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1983. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

continue to be economically strong, to provide jobs, to increase food production and to train new skills, there will be a dangerous void in the region as there is no other country that currently can do so.

Corporate interest in South Africa has remained fairly strong despite pressures, sometimes organized, from shareholder groups to divest of South African related business involvement. The list reads like a "who's who" from the New York Stock Exchange: Mobil, Caltex, Ford, General Motors, IBM, Burroughs, Control Data, Sperry, UNIVAC, Coca Cola, Holiday Inns, Minnesota Mining, Standard Oil of California, and over 80 other large corporations have been listed.¹⁰ In 1982 there were 350 American subsidiaries, affiliates, and branch offices in South Africa.¹¹ They employ 60,000 to 70,000 black workers¹² which lends support to the constructive engagement policy even though this employment represents barely one percent of the black labor force. In an effort to increase business, the Reagan Administration in late 1983 opened a special trade promotion office in Johannesburg, the goal of which is to increase American trade by one billion dollars.¹³

Despite the frequent demands by shareholders to divest, despite pressures for governmental institutions to withdraw investments (direct or indirect)¹⁴, it is clear that American economic interests in South Africa both from a private (corporate) and national view remain important.

GEO-STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Volumes have been written and spoken about the strategic importance of the Republic of South Africa, with the main focus being on:

- (1) free access for the West to the Cape of Good Hope sea route which

lies between the oil of the Middle East and the industrialized oil-consuming nations of the West;

(2) Western access to the immense mineral wealth of southern Africa. This is important in view of the fact that the Soviet bloc is a net exporter of minerals critical to Western defense interests;

(3) South Africa as the strongest anti-communist nation on the African continent in view of increased Soviet expansion; and

(4) South Africa as a proven and committed Western ally in times of global conflict.

The Cape Shipping Route

The shipping route around the Cape of Good Hope, where the Atlantic and Indian Oceans come together, is vital to the economies of the free world and especially to the highly industrialized economies of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. At the present time well over a million tons of crude oil pass the Cape daily, and the dependence of Western economies on this oil is well known. Although there has been talk of energy independence in the United States, there is no realistic prospect of it in the foreseeable future.

The importance of commercial shipping in general along the Cape route for the United States and Europe is underlined by the 24,000 ocean-going ships which pass the Cape every year. When the Suez Canal was closed in 1967 the Cape route became the "most crowded shipping lane in the world."¹⁵ Although reopened, the Suez Canal remains vulnerable to Middle Eastern instability. It is unable to accomodate modern super tankers since some 80% of the ships currently under construction exceed a weight of

200,000 tons and are thus larger than the largest ships now able to pass¹⁶ through the Canal (125,000 tons in ballast). Today, more than half of Europe's oil supplies (some 12 million barrels of oil per day) and a quarter of its food passes the Cape. Trade around the Cape of Good Hope now totals over 2300 vessels per month, of which 600 are tankers; moreover, of the total tonnage passing around the Cape, 70% is represented by oil-carrying vessels.¹⁷

In terms of U.S. naval interests, the Cape is important for travel between the South Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. The sole American base in the Indian Ocean is the naval depot at Diego Garcia. There are a few other ports-of-call, such as Bahrain, Mombasa, and Berbera that are currently available to support our naval operations. Such facilities, even though Diego Garcia is being increased in size, may not be adequate in the coming years, particularly as the U.S.S.R.'s naval force has steadily increased its Indian Ocean presence apparently on a permanent basis.¹⁸ The United States has publicly asserted that it would employ military strength, if necessary, to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil. Thus, it can be assumed that US naval presence must grow in the Indian Ocean or have such a contingency capability. In either case the Cape route would assume greater importance to the maintenance of our worldwide security interests and capabilities.

The importance of the Cape route to US interests naturally bears upon the location and geography of South Africa, with its huge 2900 kilometer coastline and its sophisticated port facilities. This is true particularly as vessels have traditionally sailed around the Cape of Good

Hope close to land for reasons of economy, convenience, and safety. Strong currents farther to the south make it dangerous for most ships to pass the Cape very far from shore.

It must be mentioned that a counter-argument exists which tends to downplay the Cape route's strategic importance. Should the Soviets seek to spark a global conflict by halting oil flows to the Western industrialized nations, they would be much better advised to do so closer to the ships' passage in the Gulf of Hormuz, through which tankers pass every 13 minutes,¹⁹ or at the voyage's end in the western approaches rather than in the southern Indian Ocean or in the South Atlantic, where Soviet navy ships are only sparsely deployed. Likewise, bombing or sabotaging oil fields or militarily occupying key oil-producing areas in the Persian Gulf would be swifter, easier, and more direct. These factors taken together have led some African specialists to conclude that South Africa's naval and air bases are "simply irrelevant to the protection of oil shipments from the Gulf States."²⁰

While a perspective that dismisses the relevance of the Cape of Good Hope shipping routes to Western security (economic as well as military) is a valid argument, it must not cause foreign policy-makers or military planners to dismiss it too quickly. Contingencies which are devastating in their eventuality, even though remote in probability, must be considered.²¹ As such, the safety of and assured access to the Cape of Good Hope shipping routes must be considered as a significant geo-strategic interest.

The Mineral Crisis

By now Americans are all too familiar with the energy crisis. But most are only dimly aware of the developing mineral crisis, even though it has the potential for turning the "moral equivalent of war" into the real thing. The United States Government lists 36 materials, from asbestos to zinc, as "strategic" - essential to American industry and defense - and the nation depends heavily on imports from other countries for 23 of them. (See Appendix B - Strategic Minerals for a detailed discussion of selected minerals). Many of the most important minerals are imported from sub-Saharan African nations, some of which are unfriendly and most of which are politically volatile.

This raises the fear of a critical disruption of supplies which could cause potentially disastrous results. At the moment, for example, the United States imports 91% of its chromium, a vital ingredient in stainless steel, oil refineries, and power plants. More than 97% of the world's known supplies are in South Africa and neighboring Zimbabwe, the former a hotbed of racial unrest, the latter showing Marxist tendencies.

Although some materials can be used to substitute for chromium in various applications, the National Materials Advisory Board has concluded that: "No substitutes exist or are likely to be developed for chromium in the high-strength steels, high-temperature metals and corrosion-resisting alloys that essential in the manufacture of jet engines, petrochemical and power plant equipment, and various other critical products."²² The Board warned: "the United States is strategically more vulnerable to a long-term chromium embargo than to an embargo of any other natural resource, including petroleum ...".²³

Similarly, the United States relies on sub-Saharan Africa for two-thirds of its manganese, essential for steel-making, and for nearly all of its cobalt, a key mineral for jet engines and computer hardware. As the president of a large steel producing company said: "if you can't get manganese, you can't make steel; and if you can't get chrome and cobalt, you can't fly an airplane, run a train, or build an automobile, a truck or a computer."²⁴

Soviet Adventurism in Southern Africa

Soviet interest in Africa began with Lenin's prediction that the "downfall of capitalism would be fostered by the West's isolation from the resources and markets of the Third World", Africa in particular.²⁵ And while Soviet interest in Africa generally has been ever present, it has not been a central concern of their foreign policy. Despite this, their interest and involvement in the region has been growing substantially since 1974.²⁶ From a global-strategic viewpoint three motives guide Soviet policy in southern Africa: national security, anti-imperialism, and the Brezhnev Doctrine.²⁷

In support of its national security the Soviet Union seeks above all to mitigate Western (primarily American) influence wherever it may directly, or indirectly, threaten the U.S.S.R. For example, installation of new drydock facilities in Mozambique in 1981 was undoubtedly influenced by a growing American presence in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets have felt pressure to strengthen their naval capabilities in light of American facilities at Diego Garcia, Mombasa, and Berbera.

The second broad motivation, anti-imperialism, is an aggressive attempt

to erode the influence of the United States as the dominant world power. This motive drives Soviet propaganda and support for insurgents in southern Africa and is designed to radicalize the rest of Africa.

The third motivation, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, asserts that the Kremlin will not allow its clients to be overthrown. Thus we see the large effort by Soviet-surrogate Cubans trying to shore up the Angolan government and a massive Soviet intervention in Ethiopia. Recent history has shown that any overt attempt to oust a Marxist-Leninist government risks an intervention by a tailored mix of Soviet and/or Soviet proxy forces.²⁹

With these broad motivations in mind, what then are specific Soviet interests in the Republic of South Africa and the immediate region? There appear to be two:

- the polarization of the region; and
- the cultivation of a "Soviet-African" alliance against the United States in particular and the West in general, leading to a "strategy of denial" intended either to deny or credibly threaten to deny strategic minerals to the West.

Southern Africa offers a unique opportunity for the Soviets to support these interests. Soviet strategists fully appreciate that southern Africa is not really important to the Soviet Union, but it is important to the West. They also recognize that the United States is caught in a moral dilemma: its moral opposition to apartheid and the economic and strategic benefits to be derived from the status quo.

Thus it appears the Soviet Union will continue to foster its interests by discrediting the US role as the world leader of democracy, focusing on

the protracted negotiations on Namibia's independence (in which the United States has accepted a major role as broker between the Angolan and South African governments); by building the Soviet Union's credentials as the natural ally of the oppressed South African blacks by its worldwide association with the cause of liberation; by establishing that the United States is Pretoria's patron and ally and, therefore, Africa's enemy; and finally by continuing to destabilize the southern Africa region by massive infusions of military arms and advisors.

In summary, because of the importance of southern Africa to the West, the Soviet Union maintains an interest in South Africa and her neighbors. A small Soviet investment in "liberation" might produce great gains, whereas they would lose no friends by an active, skillfully pursued policy. They might, however, succeed in provoking the United States to aid a racist government which would "permanently polarize the region and bring within reach the long-range goal of a southern Africa united under 'socialist orientation'".³⁰

South Africa As A Historical Ally

For the entire first half of the 20th Century the Republic of South Africa has cooperated with the United States in world conflicts, and has fought as a US ally in both the First and Second World Wars. In 1949 the government in South Africa was one of the first to send an air crew in support of the massive airlift to Berlin. This reportedly was one of the reasons for the American decision to be among the first nations to upgrade their diplomatic representation in South Africa to Ambassadorial level in 1949.³¹

In 1950, in response to a request from the United Nations after the North Korean attack on South Korea, South Africa sent an air force fighter-bomber squadron to assist U.N. forces. It was attached to a U.S. Air Force fighter-bomber wing.³²

During the late 1950s South Africa actively sought inclusion in NATO participation to include establishment of NATO bases in South Africa. Although this never materialized South Africa did support NATO naval forces by allowing regular use of its ports and through participation in naval exercises in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

South Africa was also very cooperative with the United States in the space program. In 1960 agreement was reached between the two countries to establish three facilities of the U.S. National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) in South Africa. The agreement covered a radio tracking station, a camera optical tracking station, and a deep space probe tracking station near Johannesburg. In 1962 agreement was also reached for the establishment of a U.S. military space tracking station. NASA held these tracking stations in very high regard according to one of their statements in July 1969 which said:

"The South African NASA tracking facility is a vital element in a global network of stations which provides the total communication link with our planetary-bound spacecraft...The NASA station was located at South Africa because it had the proper geographic location in relation to the other stations of the Deep Space Network and because it is uniquely located to allow the precise tracking of Cape Kennedy-launched spacecraft during the critical phase just after the spacecraft are placed into planetary bound trajectories...Therefore, nonavailability of the South Africa station would impose serious mission operational constraints and would degrade tracking support to a high risk condition."³³

Despite the importance attached to these installations, the desegregation movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s in the United States and the internal crises in South Africa (predominantly the Sharpeville riots) persuaded the U.S. government to shy away from official ties. American space tracking operations in South Africa therefore were discontinued in 1975.

The commitment of the American democratic administrations between 1961 and 1969 to black opportunity could not possibly be reconciled with military, space, or other official ties to a nation with a racial policy such as South Africa's.³⁴ Thus the cooperative relationship as allies began to break apart and, despite the historical ties between the two nations, has reached a stalemate situation.

POLITICAL INTERESTS

Without doubt the promotion of human rights and democratic values in all regions of the world is a basic interest and goal of the United States. It particularly applies to South Africa because of the sanctioned, indeed the legalized, policy of apartheid. Although our basic abhorrence of this policy is the major concern, it is clear that our pursuit of the end of apartheid reflects American concern with winning support among the black African states which have over fifty votes in the United Nations, and whose leaders are united in opposition to apartheid.

Secondly, stability in the sub-Saharan Africa region and South Africa's direct influence as a regional power is important. As has earlier been discussed in this Study, the Soviet Union continues to promote a centralized, authoritarian political model as the most appropriate for Third World countries. This notion "has a natural appeal to African leaders of states

beset with deep tribal and other divisions. Yet, because authoritarian solutions tend to conceal and suppress such divisions rather than attempting to resolve them, the only recourse for serious grievances is to turn to armed violence."³⁵ Thus result situations such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia for current examples. Such civil strife and armed dissidence pose the most severe threat to Western interests through instability. The United States therefore has a legitimate, pragmatic interest in promoting the advantages of a democratic, pluralistic model over the authoritarian and in continuing to champion human rights as a basic American value.

CONCLUSION

The US interests in South Africa, as identified in this Study, are not as great or as obvious as its interests in Western Europe, the Middle East, Japan, or in some other regions. However, it is evident that there are social, economic, geo-strategic, and political interests which serve to influence policy-making and decisions. The manner and degree to which these interests have been manifested in the US policy toward South Africa will be the subject of the remainder of this study.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

Since the late 1950s US foreign relations with South Africa have evolved from low priority to persistent concern. The constantly changing international arena and the internal structure of African countries has warranted an increasing role for the United States in the continent at large, and this deepening role has affected relations with South Africa, by necessity. In addition, the abiding American concern with the politics of race has had an equally important effect on our diplomatic associations with South Africa. Thus, South Africa and southern Africa have risen to a place of some prominence on the US foreign policy agenda since the mid-1970s. In 1980 Chester A. Crocker, then Director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, predicted that South African issues would continue to grow in importance and would "rank as one of the top two or three regional conflict issues of the 1980s".¹ Crocker, currently Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is now the Reagan Administration's principal broker in developing American foreign policy toward Africa in general, and for the "constructive engagement" policy towards the southern Africa region specifically. This Chapter will discuss factors influencing American foreign policy in Africa and the evolution of Crocker's current policy.

INFLUENCE FACTORS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Richard E. Bissell, in his recent book describing how US-South African relations have deteriorated during the last thirty years, simplifies the basis for influence factors from the normally asked question: "Why doesn't our government restore the harmonious relationship of the past and do something to change the idiotic policies of South Africa?"² He continues that to "'do something' means to influence the policies of the other government and society."³ Bissell then discusses "influence relationships" more in terms of "interests" as have been developed in Chapter III of this study. The influence factors I shall cover accept as given US interests in southern Africa and address the primary pressures that influence our foreign policy-makers.

The Executive Branch

The basic consideration involving attitudes of policy-makers in the Executive Branch (termed "policy elites" by Crocker) concerns how much autonomy the Executive Branch has in developing a coherent policy toward South Africa. When policy issues are out of the media spotlight and analysis, recommendations, and decisions can be made in a routine fashion by specialists within the State Department's African Bureau, the Executive Branch has appeared to have complete autonomy. Relatively few Americans in Congress, the media, or in interest groups know enough or care to seek to shape policy outcomes. "However, when an issue assumes a more crucial importance, for whatever reason, and decisions concerning it are treated as high foreign policy, the African specialists quickly lose control of policy"⁴ and too often oversimplified political extremes (such as East-

West or black-white ideologies) tend to influence policy development. The net result according to Crocker will be a "nasty debate followed by compromise, inconsistencies, public-relations posturing, and, at times, a paralysis of policy."⁵

This infers that when a difficult issue arises US diplomacy is likely to be reactive and sporadic and less likely to incorporate a comprehensive policy involving not only the basic issues but important secondary or peripheral ones as well. Such a comprehensive policy is better derived from policy experts working a problem on a continuing day-to-day basis rather than from a shot-from-the-hip recommendation pressured by the press or other interest groups.

The Congress

At a time when many other American policy influencers are gradually becoming more aware of Africa's real roles in the framework of basic U.S. interests, most Congressmen and Senators remain uninterested in African issues. No more than half a dozen Senators regularly keep abreast of African issues or are prepared to get significantly involved on specific African questions. The House of Representatives is proportionately in a similar situation. The tragedy is that while the level of interest has been and remains so low, Congressional support is required for most programs that have a real impact on foreign policy (such as economic assistance, military aid, etc.). Thus, potentially useful and needed programs too frequently get sidetracked by shortsidedness, emotional displays, oversimplifications, or lack of a strong championing voice in the legislature.

The implication for southern Africa policy is that there is no hope for a political consensus on a consistent, long-term policy, except by inaction.⁶ This is fine when Congressional inaction is what is needed, but one cannot be confident that a policy of "no policy" will always be the wisest one. Secondly, it means that the focus of Congressional interest in South African questions will be centered on aspects of racism or the communist threat to the region. With Vietnam so fresh, even a decade later, the voices to not get involved are loud and are combined with indignant denunciation over racial policies resulting in the perfect legislative environment for an inconsistent, unpredictable, and ineffectual Congressional input to policy formulation.⁷

Thirdly, our current Congressional climate favors domestication of foreign policy issues toward Africa. It is to no American legislator's advantage to speak up for the South African government or for black and white moderates proposing moderate solutions. Rather most will find it expedient to be supportive of black American concerns about apartheid. Likewise, debates tend to revolve around easily identifiable issues such as vital strategic minerals, the importance of the Cape routes, or American business investments, rather than coming to grips with the much more difficult question as to how much influence the United States really has in southern Africa and how to use it.

Public Opinion

Recent public opinion polls about Americans' attitudes toward South African issues point to two conclusions: there is a dislike of the South African system (apartheid cannot be justified and black rule in South

Africa is inevitable); and that the United States should endeavor to bring about change.⁸ But while the attitudes indicate change should be brought about (and this by only 53% of the surveyed sample), support for strong measures the U.S. might use is noticeably weak. Only an average of about 30% indicate the United States ought to take some specific measure (trade embargo, business divestiture, support to black organizations which seek change). Even among blacks surveyed the percentage rose only another 10% to take some specific action.⁹ The degree of American public commitment is reflected in questions whether or not the United States should support the whites, support the blacks, or not get involved at all if:

- internal violence increased: 52% said "Don't get involved"; 9% said support whites; 2% said support blacks.

- Communist supported violence: 49% said "Don't get involved"; 15% said support whites; 3% said support blacks.

So while Americans show a preference that the South African system is undesirable and that a change is needed, the majority want no active role in such a change.

Public Interest Groups

Most public interest groups in the United States which are focused on US-South African relations have one central theme - disengagement. The degree to which these groups are able to influence policy is a function of their funding, staff credentials, and most importantly, access to policy-makers. The major sources of public interest groups involving South Africa have been academia, foundation researchers, church-based white activist liberals, Africa-focused lobbies, civil-rights and other black

activist organizations, organized labor, and specialized groups that study or coordinate specific initiatives (such as business disinvestment in South Africa).¹⁰

The impact of public interest groups on the policy-making process is difficult to assess because there has been no specific, aggressive action-oriented policy (perhaps this in itself reflects the low degree of impact) from the past or current administrations. It appears, however, that the broad political orientation of administrations will tend to determine how much influence public interest groups will have. The Carter administration, for example, with its liberal suasion from United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young and his deputy Donald McHenry, gave a more open ear to interest groups than did the more conservative Nixon administration or the present Reagan one. The "bottom line" is that interest groups have shown little ability by themselves to significantly shape foreign policy toward South Africa.

THE ROAD TO "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT"

With US national interests and national influence factors as a backdrop for policy-making, the development of the US approach with respect to southern Africa during the past two decades has resulted in five distinct policy postures. These can be labeled "benign neglect, containment-confrontation, containment-crisis management, accommodation, and constructive engagement."¹¹

The Policy of "Benign Neglect"

The policy of benign neglect actually characterized U.S. policy from

the end of World War II until about 1975. Over this lengthy period there existed a basic consistency to American policy: each administration maintained good relations with the minority-controlled regimes in South Africa, while at the same time expressing official abhorrence of apartheid and colonialism.

During the 1960s the United States demonstrated its disapproval of Portuguese rule in Mozambique and Angola and of white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa by supporting various limited actions within the United Nations. For example, the United States complied with a U.N.-sponsored embargo on arms sales to South Africa; it supported a variety of symbolic U.N. resolutions that condemned apartheid and colonialism; and, for a time, it adhered to economic sanctions against Rhodesia mandated by the Security Council. At the same time, however, no American administration sought to directly project U.S. power into the southern Africa region, or to use American influence to alter the situation of minority and colonial domination. Indeed, if there was one overriding aspect of its policy towards the region during this lengthy period, it was the limited nature of US attention and commitment. Thus has come the term "benign neglect" to describe the minimal engagement attitude from the end of the War until the early 1970s.

The "Containment Policies"

The years 1973-1976 under the Nixon administration were a watershed period for US relations with South Africa. Three significant events occurred during this period which served to negate the factors which were the foundations for the policy of benign neglect. First was the OPEC-

orchestrated rise in oil prices in 1973 and the oil boycott by the Arab producing states during the Arab-Israeli War of the same year. Both events served to highlight the political and economic import vulnerability of the United States on not only petroleum but other critical natural resources (read "minerals") as well. Because southern Africa is a treasure house of such minerals, the events of 1973 propelled the region, in the eyes of many, from an area in which US interests were minimal into one in which they were vital.

The second occurrence causing changing interest was political instability that heated up in the mid-1970s. The Portuguese empire was beginning to collapse; African insurgency within white-ruled Rhodesia was intensifying; and opposition of South African blacks to apartheid was erupting in Soweto, raising questions about the future stability of the Republic.

To this mix of national interest and political instability was added the third occurrence: the introduction of Cuban and Soviet "assistance" in aiding the Marxist-oriented faction to seize and consolidate power in post-colonial Angola. The cumulative effect of these events drew South Africa into the midst of international tension and propelled it to a much higher position in US foreign policy interests. The alternative policy to follow "benign neglect" was developed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. His preferred response to the projection of Soviet power into southern Africa was an extension of the strategy of containment that had governed US foreign policy globally since the end of the war. To prevent the undermining of western dominance in Africa by the Soviets and to protect the credibility of America's will and ability to act as a global power guaranteeing democratic stability, Kissinger sought to prevent a Soviet

success in Angola by making their involvement there prohibitively expensive. He proposed military assistance to Angolan factions opposing the Marxists thereby confronting the Soviet Union through assistance to our "allies" in Angola. Hence, the policy of "containment-confrontation".¹²

The effort at containment in southern Africa through confrontation was short-lived. The US Congress, weary of military involvements in the Third World in the wake of Vietnam, expressly forbade through the Clark Amendment ¹³ the provision of direct or indirect military assistance to Angolan factions. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), with Cuban and Soviet support, ultimately prevailed.

For Kissinger the dangers of Soviets expansion in southern Africa and the need for a containment policy there did not cease with the Congressional denial or the MPLA victory. Indeed they became more intense. By 1976, guerrilla movements based in Zambia and aided by Cuba and the Soviets appeared to offer a serious military challenge to the white-minority government of Rhodesia, and there were signs that a Soviet-backed nationalist movement, SWAPO (South West African People's Organization), operating out of southern Angola, had become a major factor in Namibia (South West Africa). "The possibility grew of an emerging pattern of accommodation to the reality of Soviet presence and American inaction," Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1976.¹⁴

After Angola it was the intensifying nationalist struggle for Rhodesia that Secretary Kissinger viewed as the target for further expanding Soviet presence in southern Africa. With a direct US counter-response precluded by domestic non-support of the minority white Rhodesian regime, Kissinger sought an alternative means of blocking the spread of Soviet involvement

and influence. If a "moderate" negotiated solution to the Rhodesian problem could be obtained, then the reason for the guerrilla insurgency, and the vehicle for Soviet advances, would be eliminated as would the need for a direct counter-response to the Russians. For this reason, beginning in the spring of 1976, Kissinger embarked upon a well-publicized and dramatic stint of shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa. Its purpose was to use the influence of the United States both to end the guerrilla war and to displace Rhodesia's white minority regime with a moderate government based upon majority rule. The primary motivation and goal of US policy - containing the Soviet Union - was the same as it had been during the Angolan Civil War. But the approach had now switched from direct confrontation to crisis management.¹⁵

Accommodation Policies of the Carter Administration

The policy of the Carter administration toward southern Africa contained elements both of change and of continuity in respect to its predecessor administrations. While the basic framework for "containment" was continued in hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and for keeping an eye on the impending problem in Namibia, a major change in the administration's approach to the Republic of South Africa became evident. The previous Nixon and Ford administrations were perceived in sub-Saharan Africa as relatively friendly to South Africa. President Carter broke clearly and dramatically with this posture when, early in his term, leading administration spokesmen began to criticize the apartheid regime and called for the introduction of majority rule in South Africa. The most significant of these early administration statements was that by Vice

President Mondale, who, in a meeting with South African Prime Minister Vorster, spoke of the goal of full political participation by all South African citizens, subsequently interpreted as "one-man, one-vote."¹⁶ The effect of this and similar statements was, on the one hand, to drive a wedge between Washington and Pretoria, and, on the other, to align the government of the United States with the long-term goal being pursued by the states of sub-Saharan Africa.

A second difference between the Carter and previous administrations was the more active coordination of the United States with the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; i.e. South Africa's immediate neighbors) in attempting to settle regional problems. In particular, they began to play a leading role in defining the terms of acceptable settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia. The United States adapted its position to their concerns, rather than constructing its own political framework and attempting to persuade others to accept. The implication of this major change from "initiator" to "facilitator" was that African views and interests would begin to play a more important role in the definition of American policy in the region. Consequently, the Carter administration's approach to foreign policy in southern Africa has been referred to as "accommodationist".

Within the Carter administration there were two differing viewpoints on where Africa fit into US interests. The strongest support for the accommodationist approach came from U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young and from the State Department's Africa Bureau. Consequently, their policy positions became characterized as being "Africanist" or "regionalist". The second viewpoint originated from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who

was primarily concerned with the global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Brzezinski warned of the threat of Soviet expansion in Africa and policies needed to counter it, they were labeled as "globalist". The inclusion of both regionalist and globalist tendencies within the Carter administration undermined the credibility and longevity of the basic accommodation policy approach. It prevented the emergence of a clear justification and explanation of the administration's policy toward southern Africa. During the 1980 presidential election campaign Carter's policy was consequently criticized as placing African interests above American and as failing to halt the spread of Soviet influence into southern Africa.¹⁷

Constructive Engagement

The election of Ronald Reagan has resulted in a sharp alteration in United States policy. This administration has defined southern Africa as a region in which the activity of the Soviet Union threatens vital strategic and economic interests of the United States, and in which Soviet advances during the past half-decade have undermined the stature of the United States as a global power. In keeping with the administration's paramount concern over the Soviet global threat, many of the evolving foreign policy formulations have a decidedly anti-Soviet theme and have resulted in a break with the Carter accommodationist policy and a return to the traditional post-war American strategy of containing the Soviet Union worldwide.

Within this global context, the Reagan administration regional approach takes the form of reliance upon stability and constructive change from the South African white leadership in order to create a more harmonious regional

environment, one that will protect important US interests in sub-Saharan Africa (and in southwest Asia). This policy, now known as "constructive engagement", seeks to emphasize positive inducements (carrots) rather than negative pressures (sticks). In order to gain the confidence of the South African regime, the administration has taken a number of actions, including the following: vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning South African raids into Angola; allowed a South African rugby team to visit the United States; lessened restrictions on exports of nonlethal equipment for use by South African security forces; and discussed the possibility of exports of nuclear materials for use by South Africa's nuclear power industry.¹⁸

Other measures include a \$4 million-a-year scholarship program to bring 100 black South African students annually to the United States to study in American universities; training programs in cooperation with the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of International Organizations) for black South African trade unionists; financial support to small business development in black communities; and financial support for tutors to help black South African high school students to improve their chances of entering professional schools.¹⁹

Secretary of State George Shultz has emphasized this less antagonistic approach in stating: "We have persistently argued that proposals...which seek to punish South Africa are counterproductive. They hurt the very people we are trying to help. This means fewer jobs and less enlightened management for black South Africans and less trade for development-hungry southern Africa."²⁰

NAMIBIA: A SHORT-TERM RISK FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION

The United States, in assuming the leading role in settling the Namibian independence problem, is gambling that the long-term payoffs from achieving a settlement will exceed the short-term political costs of being perceived as having tilted American policy in favor of the white regime in South Africa.²¹

South Africa gained control over South West Africa (now Namibia) at the end of World War I under the provisions of a mandate from the League of Nations. The terms of the mandate were that South Africa was entrusted "to promote to the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and social progress of the inhabitants" of the territory.²² Although it was allowed to administer the territory as an integral part of the Union of South Africa, the South African government was required to submit annual reports on performance of its duties to the League Council. As far as South Africa was concerned, its obligations were pro forma. Shortly after the terms of the mandate were announced, South Africa's representative at the Versailles peace talks (and future Prime Minister), Jan Smuts, remarked that "the relations between the South West Protectorate and the Union amount to annexation in all but name."²³ In March 1946 South Africa proposed to the United Nations (the successor to the League of Nations) that it be allowed to annex South West Africa, arguing that the territory would never be ready for ultimate self-government and separate statehood because of its lack of economic resources and the backwardness of its inhabitants. In December the United Nations refused South Africa's request. South Africa then rejected the UN claim to authority over South West Africa, but it agreed not to

proceed with incorporation and to continue to submit reports on its administration of the territory. Only two years later South Africa directly ignored the desires of the United Nations by ceasing submission of reports and by transferring control of South West Africa from the "Administrator of SWA" to the South African Parliament, to include giving representative seats in the South African Senate and Assembly. South West Africa was now completely immersed in South African politics.

Between 1950 and 1976 South Africa and the United Nations fought a series of bureaucratic and legal battles which produced no fruitful change in the situation. In 1977, the then five Western members of the U.N. Security Council - Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (now known as the Contact Group) - launched a joint diplomatic effort to bring a peaceful, internationally acceptable transition to independence for Namibia. Their efforts led to the presentation in April 1978 of a proposal - approved in Security Council Resolution 435 - for settling the Namibian problem. The proposal, which has been accepted by the United Nations and is known as the "U.N. Plan", was worked out after lengthy consultations with South Africa, the Front-Line States, SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization), U.N. officials, and the Contact Group. It calls for the holding of direct elections in Namibia under U.N. supervision and control, the cessation of hostile acts by all parties, and restrictions on the activities of South African and Namibian armed forces.²⁴

Resolution of the Namibian problem has taken on a major importance to the Reagan administration in its attempts to prove the viability of its constructive approach in southern Africa. The formulation of its policy,

however, was disconcertingly slow primarily due to the delay of the Senate to confirm the appointment of Chester Crocker as Assistant Secretary of State and the slowness of the new administration to appoint an ambassador to Pretoria.²⁵ This slowness was actually advantageous to South Africa from the viewpoint that it allowed time for the State Department to formulate a southern Africa policy sympathetic to the Republic, and for the effective South African lobby in the United States to ensure that its voices were heard.²⁶

Recently Secretary Crocker's attempts to force a resolution of Namibia's independence has taken on more urgency. Although all Presidents state that foreign policy is "above partisan politics", it does not hurt to have foreign policy victories in an election year. Early in 1984 Secretary Crocker told South African Prime Minister Botha that President Reagan wanted fresh concessions to show voters that his policy of constructive engagement with the white regime in Pretoria was paying off.²⁷ But perhaps more important for the US African policy is the need to show black Africa that the policy is making progress towards Namibian independence. This is the crux of the US situation: a desire to work with the South African government to elicit peaceful change on the one hand, but a perception by the rest of sub-Saharan Africa that America is not doing enough in substance and speed on the other.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Chester A. Crocker, "The U.S. Policy Process and South Africa," in The American People and South Africa, ed. by Alfred O. Hero, Jr., p. 139.
2. Richard E. Bissell, South Africa and the United States: The Erosion of an Influence Relationship, p. xiii.
3. Ibid.
4. Crocker, p. 141.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 150.
7. Ibid.
8. Milfred C. Fierce, "Black and White American Opinions Towards South Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, December 1982, p. 671.
9. Ibid., p. 686.
10. Crocker, p. 155.
11. Robert M. Price, "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: Interests, Choices, and Constraints," in International Politics in Southern Africa, ed. by Gwendolyn M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, p. 45.
12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. Bissell, p. 29.
14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward Africa, Hearings, March 5, 1976, p. 193.
15. Price, p. 50.
16. Ibid., p. 51.
17. Ibid., p. 52.
18. Michael Clough, "From South West Africa to Namibia," in Changing Realities in Southern Africa, ed. by Michael Clough, p. 89.

19. "Reagan Administration's Africa Policy: A Progress Report," Department of State Bulliten, November 1983, p. 6.

20. "Shultz Urges South Africa to Mute Apartheid Policy," Washington Post, 30 March 1984, p. A27.

21. Clough, p. 89.

22. Ibid., p. 62.

23. Ibid.

24. "Security Council Makes Unanimous Demand for Free Elections in Namibia Under United Nations Supervision," United Nations Chronicle, February, 1976, pp. 18-19.

25. Christopher R. Hill, "The Western European States and Southern Africa," in International Politics in Southern Africa. ed. by Gwendolyn M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, p. 110.

26. The extent of the South African lobbying effort in the United States is not widely known. Justice Department documents show that 31 agents, some with close ties to the Reagan administration, now represent South African interests, compared with 22 in 1979. Nine of the 31 directly represent either the government, the embassy, or Pretoria's consulates in the United States. The Department's records indicate that South African lobbying strategy embraces a wide array of social and official contacts on Capital Hill and in the Reagan administration. For a description of recent lobbying efforts see: Rick Atkinson, "Law Firm's Split Airls Lobbying By South Africa," Washington Post, 12 March 1984, p. A1.

27. Mark Whitaker, "A Sham - Or a Step to Peace?" Newsweek, 13 February 1984, p. 36.

CHAPTER V

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

In the intraregional politics of sub-Saharan Africa one issue has emerged upon which there is unanimous agreement: the need to complete the process of removing white minority rule from the continent. Continent-wide attention is thus focused on the last vestiges of this rule, first in Namibia, and then, most importantly, in South Africa. The histories of colonialism and white minority rule have made this a natural issue around which the otherwise divided states of Africa can unite in common cause. Indeed, the symbol of African identity in world affairs has become active opposition to white supremacy in southern Africa as a first matter of foreign policy. A country like Nigeria, which aspires to a leadership role in continental affairs and which also has a position of some weight in international forums, seeks to establish its legitimacy to "speak for Africa" through its tough stance on South Africa's apartheid regime.

The implications of this fact for the United States are twofold. First, a policy that can be interpreted as lending support to the current political arrangements in South Africa and Namibia will be viewed as opposed to African interests. Indeed, given the sensitivity of African states on the issue of South Africa, a neutral stance would not be sufficient; in order to be perceived as a friend of sub-Saharan Africa, a posture of active opposition to the apartheid regime is probably required. This reality has not been altered by Pretoria's recent promises of domestic change or of the granting of the voting franchise to Asians and coloureds. The states of sub-Saharan Africa completely discount these claims. They accurately point

out the fact that these recent reforms are not directed toward the type of political restructuring that would significantly diminish the strength of white supremacy. In any case, African states view continued pressure on Pretoria as an essential ingredient to produce such politically significant reform.

To argue, as former National Security Advisor Richard Allen has, that the United States can and should have "normal" relations with South Africa while at the same time disapproving of their apartheid system, just as it has with other countries whose domestic arrangements it does not admire (such as the Soviet Union, China, Bulgaria, the Phillipines, etc.), misses the point entirely. The issue is not the relationship between America's morality and its foreign policy, although this point is often made, but rather that the countries of Africa are making US relations with South Africa the touchstone of their relations with America. Like it or not, the United States is in a position where it must choose. Thus, a policy of repairing the "damage" in Washington-Pretoria relations that resulted from the Carter administration policy, as the Reagan administration appears to desire, may have a negative effect on US relations with the rest of the African continent.¹

The second implication of the primacy of the minority-rule issue is that the definition of regional political conflict and change in East-West terms will have limited credibility within Africa. African states will evaluate local political movements as well as the actions of outsiders - be they Cubans, Russians, or Americans - in terms not only of aid provided, but more particularly in respect to their role in furthering the demise of

white rule in South Africa. This is the root of the great dilemma faced by the United States in its role in bringing about the end of South African rule over Namibia. For the United States to provide any support to either South Africa or their backed UNITA faction in Angola, or even threaten to do so, in order to defend self-determination and to counter the Soviet/Cuban presence, would be counterproductive. Within Africa, the United States would be perceived as destabilizing a legitimate African government and as aiding continued South African domination of southern Africa. In contrast, the Cubans and the Soviets would once again be viewed as defenders of Africa's interests and as opponents of those who practice racial rule.² A sub-Saharan Africa embittered against the United States because of its "global" approach in policies toward southern Africa would have significant foreign policy costs. The most obvious cost is in terms of access to Africa's minerals and petroleum from Nigeria (which has frequently hinted at using the oil weapon against countries it deems to be supporting white minority rule).³

CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGE OR DISENGAGE?

The alternative voice to the well publicized and oft criticized current policy of "constructive engagement" is to withdraw from the region and let them all "work it out for themselves." This, indeed, is heard more frequently in the Congress concerning other US involvements such as in the Middle East and in Central America. There is a simplistic appeal in this course of action that advocates disengagement from continuing any form of trade, investment, academic cooperation, the arts or sport - the "clean hands doctrine". This relieves the conscience, but it also dilutes the ability to influence future events.⁴

Disengagement from southern Africa is not a real option for any US administration. Conflicts in the outcome of which the United States has a stake will continue to demand US attention. No American president could remain aloof while South Africa slid into a racial war nor leave a power vacuum in the area that the Soviets might try to fill. The West European nations and southern African states themselves will expect the United States to continue to take an active part in the affairs of the region. Its lead in the Western Five Contact Group negotiations on Namibia has gained the support and confidence of the local states and has apparently won their tacit acceptance of continued American leadership. This trust (which has not been offered to the Soviet Union) should not be regarded lightly.

THE CARROT OR THE STICK

Both "carrot and stick" approaches have been tried by recent US administrations. President Carter's administration used the stick with minimal results. The Reagan administration is trying the carrot with constructive engagement and may be on the verge of success with a hoped for resolution of Namibia's independence. And the US role as honest broker has been recognized in playing a part in the peaceful dialogues now taking place between South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola. Critics of this "quiet diplomacy" are quick to point out that it has not deterred Pretoria from its apartheid policy. Thus, outside the State Department, other efforts (as have been discussed in other parts of this study) will continue to be mounted by various groups: divestment campaigns, more

restrictive import/export criteria, continued boycott of South Africa at the 1984 Olympic Games, and so on. Such actions have been designed to "send a strong signal to Pretoria" in the Congressional parlance. These signals have usually been received "with the well-known acknowledgement: 'Roger - and Out'".⁵

WHAT IS THE US ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE FUTURE?

While American interests and involvement in southern Africa will certainly continue (and increase according to some "policy elites"), there should be no unchallenged illusion that the United States can determine the future course of the region. The local states are by no means helpless or passive observers of regional developments. On the contrary, leaders of the Front Line States, acting in concert, are likely to continue playing an active part in regional political and security matters on behalf of the Organization of African Unity. Just as they were instrumental in both the Rhodesian and earlier Namibian peace initiatives, they will act as a loose consultative and guiding group in future contacts with outside powers concerning regional matters.⁶ Indeed, a proper course is for the United States to become consistently "constructively engaged" with the Front Line States in seeking an active role in pursuing regional objectives.

It must be recognized that South Africa's internal dynamics - a combination of violence, bargaining, and accommodation - will also be decisive in the outcome of regional matters. And even though the South African leaders may view their relationship with the United States as their most important one, their policies will continue marching to domestic drummers.

Other nations will also and should continue to pursue active interests

in the area: Great Britain has retained links to the seven black-ruled ex-British colonies - Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - and to the Republic of South Africa; Angola and Mozambique maintain governmental relations with the Soviet Union as well as strong cultural and economic ties to Portugal, Brazil, and France; and both East and West Germany retain a lively interest in Namibia, the former German colony.

If the United States is to maintain credibility in being able to influence events in southern Africa, it must pay attention to the most frequent criticism leveled against the Reagan administration in articulating its foreign policy goals: a lack of long-term, integrated policy planning to back up strategic goals. Some specific criticisms which have been documented are as follows:⁷

- No institutionalized policy planning team is recognized by the administration. The State Department's policy planning unit, practically dormant for the past two years, has been reorganized into the form of a policy planning council.

- Foreign service and agency (including CIA) field reports and analyses are often disregarded, especially if they conflict with the administration's misconceptions.

- There is often poor inter-departmental coordination. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker does have a fairly free range in southern Africa and has held his ground against some hard administration questioning there. But in other regional matters (Chad, the Sudan), the Pentagon and other administration "experts" have sometimes circumnavigated

the State Department.

Until these types of bureaucratic problems are addressed, no coherent, long-term policy is likely to be developed and enjoy widespread backing. A policy that appears to change tack every few years, as described in Chapter IV, weakens American credibility and makes its commitments suspect. Much of this problem is, unfortunately, endemic to the American political process and is not a regional phenomenon. As Robert S. Jaster, an analyst for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, has recently stated:

"Thus an administration running behind in the pre-election polls will be tempted to discover and challenge a grand Soviet design in Shaba and its opponents to reveal a string of recent Soviet victories in Africa. Both parties know that none of this has any reality beyond the election campaign. But it weakens the steadfastness of U.S. policy in the area and confuses the American people - largely ignorant of African conditions - who can hardly support a consensus not shared by their leaders."⁸

CONCLUSIONS

A consistent policy concerning the Republic of South Africa must be based on a historical perspective of the region and careful analysis of the social and political forces shaping its future. Such an analysis suggests several considerations for American foreign policy towards southern Africa in the years ahead.

First, southern Africa will demand increased attention and adroitness in planning over the coming years. This is due to the alarming growth of Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa, both direct and by proxy, and to the growing geo-strategic value of southern Africa as discussed in Chapter III.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies has characterized the industrial West's most serious security challenge for the 1980s as "how to assure the supply, from an unstable Third World, of the raw materials on which its economic well-being, domestic stability, and political cohesion had come to depend".⁹ Such a challenge cannot but affect Western involvement in southern Africa. This may be reinforced by the perilous nuclear strategic and conventional East-West military balances in the mid-to-late 1980s, which might become a time of heightened world tensions or even one of an outbreak of conflict involving critical Western interests (i.e. in the Persian Gulf). This too cannot but affect the Western stance toward southern Africa.

The second consideration is premised on the idea that traditional American values apply in southern Africa as elsewhere around the World, and that the U.S. should vigorously support Western-leaning, multi-racial, and capitalistic systems in southern Africa as it has and continues to do globally. Apart from the repulsive and overshadowing racism, the political and economic values of South Africa have much in common with those the United States has historically championed. Such values should not become victims of guilt by association. Hence, the United States should continue the thrust of constructive engagement by encouraging and assisting in accelerated social, economic, and political change in South Africa and Namibia in order to lead to a true sharing of power among all ethnic groups; help stabilize the more moderate regimes in the region; discourage Soviet/Cuban political influence (particularly their military fueling of conflicts); foster American and Western access to the vast resource

supplies, to strategic intelligence, and to facilities in time of crisis; and seek to minimize any negative repercussions in the rest of the continent to southern Africa policies.

The third consideration rests on the premise that Pretoria will be increasingly self- and regionally-centered, thereby divorcing itself from large dependence on US goals or plans in order to further its own policies. In fact South Africa has increasingly sounded out similarly beleaguered states around the world to form a new "Fourth World" of outcast states. In 1977 P.W. Botha, then the South African Minister of Defense and now Prime Minister, said that South Africa "must look for her welfare toward the Fourth World -- middle class and smaller nations which won't bow to Marxism or the self-interest of the superpowers".¹⁰ Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa -- the most oft-mentioned of such nations -- share certain fundamental perceptions and concerns. Each fears for its very existence and desperately seeks help to preserve its security. Given this perception of danger and their levels of development and technical competence, it follows that the four are among the world's prime candidates for nuclear proliferation, if in fact they lack nuclear weapons now. Long inimical to the Communist bloc and excluded from the nonaligned group, they now feel shunned - though to varying degrees and in varying ways - by the West as well. Military consultations and weapons sales, exchange of technology, and significant economic interaction are found among these "Fourth World" nations. Though South Africa's hopes for greater diplomatic acceptability worldwide reside, to some extent, with furthering this loose network, it is improbable. The prospective "pariah" alliance seems far-fetched, no matter how enticing the concept may appear to Prime Minister

Botha and his colleagues. The "alliance" members lack a common enemy, the usual cement for alliances, as well as common territorial interests, race, culture, or goals to become significantly influential on a major scale.

With these considerations in mind, based on American interests in the southern Africa region, it is clear that those crying for disengagement are wrong. The United States does have a role to play in southern Africa. It must continue to make known in no uncertain fashion its disapproval of apartheid, particularly the more repulsive aspects - the forced removal of blacks into the poverty-stricken rural Bantu areas, pass-law arrests, and the more glaring abrogation of civil rights, such as detention without trial. It is unthinkable that the world's most powerful champion of democracy, whose fundamental values are based on the protection of human rights, should abdicate its responsibility in this regard.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert M. Price, "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa," in International Politics in Southern Africa, ed. by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, p. 74.

2. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

3. Tom Gilroy, "Balck Africa Criticizes Reagan Stand on South Africa," The Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1981, p. 7.

4. Helen Suzman, "What Can America Do?" The Washington Post, March 22, 1984, p. A23.

5. Ibid.

6. Robert S. Jaster, Southern Africa in Conflict: Implications for U.S. Policies in the 1980s, p. 33.

7. "The United States: Log-Jams," Africa Confidential, 4 January 1984, p. 5.

8. Jaster, p. 35.

9. Strategic Survey, 1978, p. 1

10. Kenneth L. Adelman and John Seiler, Alternative Futures in Southern Africa, p. 88.

APPENDIX A

A SUMMARY OF REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (Note 1)

This Appendix summarizes the most important repressive legislation in effect in South Africa. "Repressive legislation" refers to statutory enactments which violate the most fundamental requirements of Western law in that they permit punishment or the deprivation of property or of personal liberty without trial.

To understand the relationship of these laws to the peoples of South Africa, the following data concerning the racial mix is pertinent:

Population - Republic of South Africa²

<u>Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>%</u>
White:	5,507,000	17.8
English	(2,092,700)	
Afrikaan	(3,083,900)	
Other(German, Portugese)	(330,400)	
Black:		
Coloured	2,908,200	9.4
Asian	987,200	2.9
African	21,625,700	69.9

Bantu Administration Act of 1927

This Act, also known as the Native Administration Act, established the basic administrative structure for the government of Africans (in the reserves), vesting substantially unlimited power in the State President as "Supreme Chief" of all Africans. Despite Bantu authorities and homeland "self-government", the 1927 Act remains, after 47 years, a corner-stone of the entire apartheid structure.

The Act empowers the State President "whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest" to order the removal of a tribe, a portion of a tribe or an individual African from one place in the country to another. Under this Act any African may be removed from his home to any place designated in the removal order for as long as the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development determines. The State President is not required to give the African concerned any prior notice or hearing, and he need disclose only as much information concerning the removal as he determines to be in the public interest. Additionally, this Act:

- makes it an offense to utter any words or do anything to promote feelings of hostility between Africans and whites;
- gives broad search and seizure powers to magistrates;
- empowers a magistrate to restrict violators of the Act to reserve (Bantu) areas for specified periods of time;
- allows the State to declare non-South African violators of this Act as "undesireables" and subject to arrest and deportation;
- allows the President to prohibit, control, or regulate gatherings or assemblies of natives.

Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 and Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960

Although these Acts were enacted ten years apart, they form one legal whole. The Suppression of Communism Act, one of the earliest measures enacted by the Nationalist Party when it came to power, is the basic repressive weapon in the armory of apartheid. It has been amended, usually to stiffen its provisions or to plug loopholes, some 80 times since 1950. Its purpose is to clearly eliminate from public life all opposition to govern-

ment policy in the guise of eliminating "communism". The Act was introduced early in the Cold War period when government spokesmen warned of communist infiltration of labor unions, universities, and other areas of South African life. Playing on the fears of the white population, the Minister of Justice claimed that communists were taking advantage of the Coloureds and Africans to weld them into a group prepared to poison South Africa's food and water supplies, cut off its electric power, and murder its white population. The bloody Witwatersrand strike of 1922, the African mine-workers strike of 1946 and riots during the past decade have been blamed on communist influence.

The Act empowers the Minister of Justice (or the State President) to impose an enormous range of penalties and restrictions on individuals and groups without any trial or other judicial finding of guilt or obligation, and without any meaningful right of subsequent recourse to the courts for relief. Dissidents have only three realistic possibilities left: silence, exile, or armed opposition to the government.

Public Safety Act of 1953

This Act was introduced at a time when white South Africans had been shocked and terrified by riots and demonstrations which gave violent expression to African resentment of apartheid. The purpose of the law, as the title indicates, was "to make provision for the safety of the public and the maintenance of public order in cases of emergency." The Act has been invoked only once, in the period immediately following the Sharpeville riots in 1960, but it remains part of the government's ready-reserve of legal weapons.

The long provisions of the statute provide that the State President

may declare a state of emergency in all or part of the Republic if in his opinion it appears at any time that the public safety or order is seriously threatened anywhere in South Africa, and that the ordinary law is inadequate to assure public safety and order. This proclamation cannot be valid for longer than 12 months but it may be repromulgated for additional 12 month periods. Specific measures which are empowered to magistrates are:

- to prohibit gatherings, search persons or premises, seize documents, and to use all means necessary to protect public safety and order;

- to arrest persons without warrant and detain them without trial;

- to arrest without warrant and to try in jail Africans who did not have passes or were without fixed places of employment or adequate means of livelihood;

- to make it a crime to issue any statement likely to subvert government authority, to incite others to oppose emergency measures, or to cause feelings of alarm or hostility towards others;

- to make it a crime to intimidate others or to incite anyone to strike or to protest any law in order to gain concessions or to achieve any political or economic aim;

- to order the suspension of any publication systematically publishing subversive material and to order discontinuence of activities by any organization believed to be subversive.

Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953

This statute was enacted specifically to cope with the "Defiance Campaign Against Unjust Laws", a non-violent civil disobedience movement conceived as a form of passive resistance and intended to call attention to

African grievances against the "pass laws" and other petty apartheid measures, particularly segregation in public facilities. Large numbers of Africans, along with some Indians and a few whites, openly and peacefully violated the despised laws and courted arrest, hoping to thereby clog the courts and upset the machinery of justice. The campaign failed, however, to become a full mass movement, and a number of violent riots eventually broke out. The government capitalized on white reactions to the riots, fear of increasingly effective mass action by Africans, and resentment at overseas sympathy with the Defiance Campaign, to win Parliamentary approval of this Act and its companion Public Safety Act.

Specific provisions of the Act make it illegal:

- to support protest campaigns to repeal or modify laws;
- to incite protest campaigns;
- to solicit, accept, or receive money or anything, inside or outside South Africa, to assist a protest campaign or persons involved in protest campaigns.

Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956

This is an omnibus statute which consolidated and replaced the 1914 Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act. Although directed in part to "riotous assemblies" generally, it is clear that both this statute and its predecessor were concerned with activities of labor unions, particularly those with large numbers of non-white members, and with other meetings and rallies of Africans, where they might be stirred up against the white community. At the time when this Act was enacted, Africans all over the country were protesting against various apartheid

measures, but particularly against the early attempts of the government to compel African women to carry passes. Such protests frequently erupted into violence, and some areas were in a state of near-insurrection.

This Act:

- allows a magistrate to prohibit the holding of any gathering in his district if he believes that it would seriously endanger the peace;

- makes it an offense for any person, knowing that a gathering has been prohibited, to convene, encourage, or promote attendance at, preside at such a gathering;

- makes it an offense for an individual to attend a meeting after being prohibited from attending;

- makes it an offense for a person to reproduce or disseminate in any way any speech, utterance, writing or statement made, or purported to have been made, at any prohibited meeting;

- empowers the State President to prohibit the publication or dissemination of any documentary information which he believes is likely to engender feelings of hostility between whites and non-whites;

- authorizes the deportation of non-South Africans who are convicted of this Act and who are deemed undesirable inhabitants.

General Law Amendment Act of 1962

This law, the so-called Sabotage Act, was enacted to stop the sporadic incidents of sabotage which had begun to occur late in 1961. Most of these incidents were little more than amateurish attempts to bomb government offices, the perpetrators of which were quickly apprehended. However, there were also some quite well planned attacks

on electric plants and other important facilities, which were attributed to "Umkonto We Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation), the alleged underground arm of the ANC.

The Act broadly defines "sabotage" to include not only actual acts but also illegal possession of weapons and explosives, and illegal entry of certain buildings or land. Severe penalties, including death by hanging, are specified.

General Law Amendment Act of 1963

This Act, better known as the "90-Day Law", was enacted to help the South African police cope with threats to state security which arose in the early 1960s as the ANC and other banned subversive groups went "underground" and their supporters turned increasingly to sabotage and violence. Provisions in the Act give the Special Branch of the police the power to detain in solitary confinement for up to 90 days anyone believed to be implicated in any violence (actual or projected), or to be associated with anyone else so implicated. The courts could not issue habeus corpus to release these prisoners.

REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION APPENDIX

FOOTNOTES

1. The information in this Appendix has been compiled from United Nations documents which go into extreme detail on all legal aspects of apartheid. In summarizing these laws I have attempted to use "lay language" to the maximum extent possible. While some details of the apartheid laws may thus be overlooked, this basic intent and thrust of each of the laws is present. The very detailed legal summary and analysis is contained in: United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Unit on Apartheid, Repressive Legislation of the Republic of South Africa.

2. Data compiled from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1983.

APPENDIX B

STRATEGIC MINERALS

The military security of Western societies is not threatened by a potential cutoff of access to South African minerals, but the economic and political stability of the West would certainly be threatened. The critical minerals in question for which the United States depends on South Africa for a significant portion of imports are: chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum.¹ South Africa and the Soviet Union dominate world production of these minerals and have the largest part of the world's reserves (Table 2).

Additionally, gold, which is also exported heavily by South Africa and the Soviet Union, is a critical mineral in the global economy because of its continuing importance as a store of value. An interruption in the supply of gold from these countries would not result in direct industrial damage, but it could lead to monetary instability and contribute to global inflation.²

This appendix will provide a description of the most critical "strategic" minerals to the United States and its Western allies and will provide an overview of other important minerals.

CRITICAL MINERALS

CHROMIUM is vital to the armaments, aircraft, power-generating, and machine-tool industries. With only small and low-grade domestic deposits, the United States imports more than 90% of its requirements. South Africa, the principal supplier, has raised its share of the US market from roughly a third in the mid-seventies to almost half in 1979-80. Through various

incentives to encourage the local processing of minerals, the South African government has stimulated the growth of its ferrochrome industry and the scrapping of smelting facilities in the United States and Western Europe. US imports of ferrochrome from South Africa, therefore, have also risen steeply during the past few years.

A short-term cutoff in the South African supply - up to five years - would not be critical for the United States, however. The United States has a two year stockpile of chrome ore and an eighteen month stock of ferrochrome, plus inventories held by private industry. By drawing heavily on stocks, increasing its purchases from other suppliers - Zimbabwe, the Philippines, Turkey, and the Soviet Union - and reviving domestic refining capacity, it is estimated that the United States could continue to produce essential chrome-using products in adequate quantities. The use of substitutes now available could cut present consumption by almost a third.

Beyond five years, however, the United States would have to count on developing alternative sources and new technologies - neither of which is easy or certain of result. South Africa and Zimbabwe together account for some 98% of known reserves; were they unavailable, the remainder of the world's known chromite reserves would run out in about twenty-five years, according to a study by the National Materials Advisory Board.³

MANGANESE has no known substitute as a hardening agent in the manufacture of steel. South Africa has more than 40% of known world reserves, but Gabon, Brazil, and Australia all have substantial reserves and are important suppliers of ore to the United States. As in the case of chrome, however, South Africa's low-cost refining capability makes the country the

primary source of ferromanganese to the United States.

US stockpiles contain almost a two-year supply of ore, plus six to eight months' requirements of ferromanganese. Imports from other countries, together with drawdown of existing stockpiles and industrial inventories, would see the United States through a short-term disruption of South African exports. But a long-term cutoff would pose serious problems of supply for the US steel industry: the shortage of refining capacity outside South Africa, the likely requirements of growing steel industries in supplier countries, and the uncertain future of seabed mineral exploitation all indicate that difficult and costly adjustments would be necessary.

VANADIUM is used as an addition to iron and steels, and is particularly important in the production of high-strength, light-weight steels. It is also used to produce titanium alloys which are used for jet engines, airframes, and pipelines, and a number of other applications in the transportation, construction, and defense fields. While South Africa supplies more than half of the vanadium imported by the United States, the United States itself has large reserves which should last about 15 years. In addition, vanadium is available from several foreign sources (Canada, Chile, Australia).⁴

PLATINUM - GROUP METALS in the United States are used primarily as catalyst agents in oil refining, chemical manufacture, and auto-emission control. Imports, of which South Africa is by far the largest source, make up over half of US consumption. Almost half of known global reserves are located each in South Africa and the Soviet Union, and only one percent in

the United States and Canada together. Of total world production, South Africa and the Soviet Union together account for 99%, the United States and Canada about one percent.

In spite of present US reliance on South Africa, an interruption in platinum shipments would not be critical in either the short run or the long run. This is because 70% of US use is for catalytic purposes, from which the metals in the platinum group are recoverable. Substitution with non-platinum metals, moreover, is feasible in other uses, and, in a supply crisis, platinum could be diverted from nonessential uses; almost a third of world production, for example, goes to Japan for jewelry manufacturing.⁵

TABLE 2

SOUTH AFRICA'S MINERAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S.
(in %) (NOTE 1)

	RSA % of World Production-1980	RSA % of World Reserves-1980	US Net Import Reliance-1980	% of US Import from RSA-1976-79
Antimony	15%	8%	53%	20% (Ores) 46% (Oxides)
Asbestos	5%	6%	76%	3%
Chromium	35%	68%	91%	40%
Diamonds (Industrial)	14%	7%	100%	33%
Gold	56%	64%	28%	16%
Manganese	20%	41%	97%	9% (Ores) 38% (Ferro)
Platinum - Group Metals	48%	82%	87%	53%
Vanadium	31%	49%	15%	55%

NOTES:

1. Data compiled from Minerals Commodities Summaries, 1981.
Washington: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1981.

TABLE 3

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SOVIET UNION: 1980 PRODUCTION AND
RESERVES OF 5 CRITICAL MINERALS AS A PROPORTION OF
GLOBAL PRODUCTION AND RESERVES (NOTE 1)
(IN %)

	² RSA	USSR	TOTAL
RESERVES			
Chromium.....	68	<1	69 (Note 3)
Manganese.....	41	44	85
Vanadium.....	49	46	95
Platinum-Group Metals.....	82	17	99
Gold.....	64	17	99
PRODUCTION			
Chromium.....	35	37	72
Manganese.....	20	43	63
Vanadium.....	31	27	58
Platinum-Group Metals.....	48	47	95
Gold.....	56	23	79

NOTES:

1. Table format from Congressional Research Service Study "Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and OECD Countries"; data updated from U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1981.

2. Republic of South Africa.

3. An additional 30% of global chromium reserves are held in Zimbabwe.

TABLE 4

U.S. NET IMPORT RELIANCE FOR SELECTED
MINERALS, 1981 (NOTE 1)

MINERALS AND METALS		NET IMPORT RELIANCE AS A % OF APPARENT CONSUMPTION (NOTE 2)					MAJOR FOREIGN SOURCES
		0%	25%	50%	75%	100%	
Columbium	100	*****					Brazil, Canada, Thailand
Mica(Sheet)	100	*****					India, Brazil, Madagascar
Strontium	100	*****					Mexico, Spain
Manganese	100	*****					Gabon, Brazil, RSA (Note 3)
Tantalum	100	*****					Thailand, Canada, Malaysia
Cobalt	100	*****					Zaire, Belg-Lux, Zambia
Bauxite	94	*****					Jamaica, Australia, Guinea
Chromium	91	*****					RSA, USSR, Phillipines
Platinum(Group)	87	*****					RSA, USSR, UK
Fluorspar	84	*****					Mexico, RSA, Spain
Tin	84	*****					Malaysia, Bolivia
Asbestos	76	*****					Canada, RSA
Nickel	73	*****					Canada, Norway
Cadmium	62	*****					Canada, Australia, Mexico
Potassium	62	*****					Canada, Israel
Zinc	58	*****					Canada, Honduras, Peru
Tungsten	54	*****					Canada, Bolivia, Peru
Antimony	53	*****					RSA, Bolivia, China
Ilmenite	47	*****					Canada, Australia
Selenium	40	*****					Canada, Japan, Yugoslavia
Barium	38	*****					Peru, Ireland, Mexico
Gypsum	38	*****					Canada, Mexico, Jamaica
Gold	28	*****					Canada, USSR, RSA
Iron Ore	22	*****					Canada, Venezuela, Brazil
Vanadium	15	****					RSA, Chile, USSR
Copper	14	****					Canada, Chile, Peru, Zambia
		0%	25%	50%	75%	100%	

NOTES:

1. Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodities Summaries, 1981.
Washington: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1981.

2. Apparent Consumption is defined as U.S. primary plus secondary
production plus net import reliance.

3. Republic of South Africa.

MINERALS APPENDIX

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, "Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and OECD Countries," prepared for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the U.S. Senate, p. 259.

2. Robert S. Jaster, Southern Africa in Conflict: Implications for U.S. Policies in the 1980s, p. 43.

3. Contingency Plans for Chromium Utilization, National Materials Advisory Board, p. 2.

4. U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, "Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and OECD Countries, " p. 261.

5. Jaster, p. 44.

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:
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
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